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June 23, 2003
On June 23, Congressman Curt Weldon spoke to members and friends of FPRI about his recent trip to North Korea, outlining the peace initiative described below. Audio of this lecture is available online on this website.
On May 30 - June 2, I led a bipartisan congressional delegation composed of six Members of the House of Representatives to Pyongyang, North Korea (Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea/DPRK). The delegation included Solomon Ortiz (D-TX), Silvestre Reyes (D-TX), Joe Wilson (R-SC), Jeff Miller (R-FL) and Eliot Engel (D-NY). The delegation was the largest congressional delegation to visit the DPRK and the first to visit the DPRK in five years. The visit occurred during a period of escalating tensions between the DPRK, the United States, and nations of the region resulting from the DPRK October, 2002, admission of its nuclear weapons-related uranium enrichment program. Subsequent DPRK withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); confirmation of its possession of nuclear weapons; expelling of IAEA inspectors; declared intentions to reprocess its spent fuel; continued sales of missiles and technology to terrorist nations; and allegations of nation-sponsored drug trafficking all served to further raise tensions between the DPRK and the international community.
Discussions with senior DPRK officials included the predictable hard line rhetoric associated with recent DPRK public statements. Still, balanced discussion took place in the formal as well as more personal informal sessions. The demonstrated goodwill and willingness to go beyond first level posturing gave the delegation reason to believe that there are options that should be considered to avoid conflict and resolve critical outstanding issues in a way satisfactory to both sides. Failure to address these critical issues in a timely manner could result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and/or technology to terrorist organizations and States. DPRK officials repeatedly stated their belief that the Bush Administration seeks regime change in North Korea, “The Bush Administration finds regime change in different nations very attractive … and is trying to have regime change, one by one. This kind of conduct damages the U.S. image in the world and weakens the leadership role of the U.S. This is the heart of the question. If the U.S. would sign a non-aggression pact, we would give up nuclear programs and weapons.” The DPRK seeks normalization of relations and non-interference with its economic relations with South Korea and Japan. They see the issue of regime change as the determining factor in whether a peaceful resolution to the current standoff is possible.
The purpose of our visit was neither to negotiate nor to bring any messages from President Bush. We wanted simply to open a channel of communication. After hearing the DPRK presentations, I developed a two-step plan intended to ease tensions that was presented to our North Korean counterparts. It is presented here in outline.
Five Simultaneous Actions to Begin the Peace Process.
Following the end of one year or the agreed upon time frame and the satisfactory completion of the inspection of DPRK facilities and locations, compilation of nuclear weapon and material inventories and ratification of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty.
Each of the senior DPRK officials with whom the delegation met cited the importance of the visit, given the current tense relationship between the DPRK and the U.S. They also noted their understanding of the role of Congress and that the delegation was not visiting to negotiate issues for the United States, but to enhance mutual understanding between the two nations.
Each of the senior DPRK officials noted the tense international situation and sought to place the blame on the U.S. “because the U.S. seeks to make us give up our military forces which safeguard our political system.” Each of the leaders also cited their preference for the “Clinton approach” in the bilateral relationship and took strong exception to President Bush’s inclusion of the DPRK as part of the “Axis of Evil.” They stated their belief that such a characterization demonstrates that the U.S. is unwilling to “accommodate with our country” and the U.S. seeks regime change. “Further, the U.S. is enlisting other nations to prepare a nuclear first strike— seeking to blackmail and intimidate us… The U.S. does not want to coexist with us … And not only does the Bush Administration not want to coexist, but wishes to get rid of my nation with its nuclear strength … We see the U.S. preparing for a military strike … The U.S. must change its hostile policy.” Without necessarily supporting the Bush Administration policies toward the DPRK, all members of the delegation agreed with Representative Engel’s point to DPRK officials, that violations of the 1994 Agreed Framework by the DPRK were the reason for the current tensions, not the Bush Administration.
The DPRK officials stated their belief that the situation can only be resolved by acceptance of the current leadership— coexistence— and dialogue. And in the meantime it intends to continue to develop its “restraint capability” (nuclear deterrent). “We have tried dialogue and have been patient_Our willingness to meet in Beijing in April shows our flexibility to allow the U.S. to save face, showing our flexibility and sincerity to resolve the issues at any cost … We have not had concrete results. The Bush Administration has not responded to our request for bilateral talks— they are more focused on our first giving up our nuclear program_This causes us to believe that the Bush Administration has not changed its policy about disarming my nation_We want to conclude a non-aggression treaty between the two countries and avoid a military strike on my country.” Clearly, American agreement to a non-aggression agreement by the United States and continued dialogue would send the message to North Korea that the goal of the United States is to have a nuclear free Korean Peninsula, and that such a goal can be achieved without war or regime change. It would also remove their only argument for continuing to pursue the development of nuclear weapons— a possible attack by the United States. Removing that argument would force the North Koreans to reveal their true intentions with respect to their nuclear program while simultaneously sending the message to the DPRK and America’s detractors around the world that we are not intent on imposing our will around the globe through the use of force.
DPRK officials maintained that their nuclear program is only for deterrence and not being pursued to seek economic aid— that “we only wish to be left alone. The nuclear issue is directly linked to the security of our nation … We need frank exchange on nuclear policies. Our purpose in having a restraint (deterrent) is related to the war in Iraq. This is also related to statements by the hawks within the U.S. Administration. Our lesson learned is that if we don’t have nuclear restraint (deterrent), we cannot defend ourselves.” Finally, I deem it essential that the five member nations of the Korean Peace Coalition continue to support increased levels of discussion and cooperation between North and South Korea and strive for the eventual normalization of relations between the DPRK and the rest of the world.
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